NCAA has argued that its restraints on student-athlete names and likenesses serve the necessary purpose of maintaining competitive balance in college sports. 2 In addition, the NCAA has asserted that if its nationwide restraints are overturned, it would financially "destroy college sports for the vast majority of student-athletes." 3 This Article analyzes the pertinent legal issues in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation and explains why a plaintiffs' victory would not lead to the demise of college sports as the NCAA suggests. Part I of this Article provides a history of the college sports marketplace, including its historic governance structure and its transition of economic power from individual colleges to the NCAA. Part II discusses the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation in terms of its procedural history and core legal principles. Part III explains why a win for the plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation would not truly destroy competitive balance in college sports. Finally, Part IV explains why a win for the plaintiffs similarly would not destroy the financial viability of college sports. 2 See NCAA's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 1, at *17-22 (explaining various reasons as to how the NCAA's "amateurism" rules purportedly help to maintain competitive balance in college sports and thus keep college athletics viable); see also Order Denying Motions to Compel Production of Documents by Nonparties, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., Nos. 09-cv-01967-CW (NC), 11-mc-80300 CW (NC), 12-mc-80020 CW (NC), 2012 WL 629225, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2012) ("In support of one of its affirmative defenses, the NCAA claims that the NCAA's rules . . . promote amateurism and competitive balance between and among NCAA member institutions."). 3 See Lester Munson, Players Seek 'Quick Look' Win in Court, ESPN OUTSIDE THE LINES (Nov. 22, 2013, 7:35 PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10018003/lawyers -obannon-vs-ncaa-case-trying-same-tactic-defeated-ncaa-1984-case (quoting NCAA chief legal officer Donald Remy, who stated that the plaintiffs suing the NCAA in the O'Bannon case seek "to destroy college sports for the vast majority of student-athletes in order to pay a few"); see also Defendant NCAA's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 3, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. 09-cv-1967-CW, 2013 WL 5402510 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 27, 2013) (purporting that the NCAA rules that preclude student-athlete compensation "'allow its survival in the face of commercializing pressures'" (quoting McCormack v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344-45 (5th Cir. 1988)). [Vol. 92, 1019 adopted the moniker, the Big Nine Conference. 18 In 1917, it added a tenth team and changed its moniker to the Big Ten. 19 The Big Ten Conference, from its inception, has been the most organized of the early college athletic conferences. 20 Whereas many early athletic conferences ignored issues related to athlete eligibility, the Big Ten Conference has long enforced rules that limit eligibility to "full-time students who were not delinquent in their studies." 21 Under the leadership of a conference commissioner, the Big Ten Conference has also historically prohibited its members from scheduling non-conference games against colleges that do not adhere to its strict academic requirements. 22 Nevertheless, none of the early athletic conferences-not even the Big Ten Conference-have historically enforced meaningful rules to limit on-field violence in college football. As a result, by the early twentieth century, investigative journalists had come to criticize college football for its high number of head and neck injuries. 23 In November 1905, the Washington Post even detailed the fate of William Moore, a Union College football player who lost consciousness when he attempted "to get through the [New York seven colleges included the University of Chicago, University of Illinois, University of Michigan, University of Minnesota, Northwestern University, Purdue University, and University of Wisconsin); see generally WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 50 (noting that for a brief period of less than one year, this conference included Wake Forest University rather than the University of Michigan). 18 See Big Ten History, supra note 17. 19 See id. 20 See id. (discussing the implementation of the Big Ten's first eligibility rules). 21 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion by Antitrust Plaintiffs for Summary Judgment at 15, In re Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. 4:09-cv 1967 CW (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment for Antitrust Plaintiffs] (noting that "when college football was first developed, colleges and conferences adopted different definitions of amateurism"); Parasuraman, supra note 7, at 731 (referencing the concept of "home rule" where the home team made decisions about who was eligible to compete in a particular game). 22 See Teddy Greenstein, With Changes on Way, Big Ten's Delany Staying Put, CHI. TRIB. (July 1, 2008), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-07-01/sports/0806300782_1 _tranghese-bcs-commissioner-jim-delany (discussing the creation of the Big Ten's commissioner position in 1922); see also WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 183 (detailing the Big Ten Conference commissioner's discussion of a potential "white list" of acceptable opponents and blacklisting unacceptable ones). 23 University football team's center and] went at the line head first like a catapult." 24 Moore died six hours later. 25 
C. Founding of the NCAA
As journalists wrote with increasing ferocity about the dangers of college football, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt felt compelled to intervene. 26 In 1905, President Roosevelt summoned the leaders of several well-known colleges to the White House to discuss ways to improve player safety. 27 Shortly thereafter, New York University chancellor H.M. MacCracken held a separate meeting with college chancellors and presidents from throughout the country. 28 At the meeting, MacCracken proposed "the reform . . . of intercollegiate athletics as a whole" through the auspices of a private national association. 29 From these meetings came the charter of the National Collegiate Athletic Association as a trade association designed to devise formal game rules, promote safety, and give college athletics some degree of public respectability. 30 Although the NCAA's founding members did not cede any independent authority to the NCAA, they empowered their new association to serve as "a declarant of ideals" and as a 24 25 Id. 26 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 27 See Edelman & Rosenthal, supra note 23, at 1398 (discussing President Roosevelt's intervention in the college football injury crisis); see also Carter, supra note 24, at 215 (same). Some scholars believe that President Theodore Roosevelt was not entirely bothered by the physically dangerous nature of college football, but rather feared that, without change, the game would soon be abolished in its entirety. See, e.g., WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 64-65 (noting that President Roosevelt "believed strongly that football built character" and "believed just as strongly that roughness was necessary," however, "he worried that brutality and lack of sportsmanship destroyed the good effects of football"). 28 See Carter, supra note 24, at 217. 29 Id. at 217-18 (internal quotation marks omitted). 30 vehicle to make non-binding recommendations to its membership and the various athletic conferences.
31

D. College Sports Under the NCAA as a "Declarant of Ideals"
In its incipience, the NCAA served in accordance with its charter as a "minor force" in the governance of college athletics. 32 Its primary responsibilities included hosting championship events and providing a forum for colleges to discuss on-field safety issues. 33 The NCAA's most notable recommendations in its early years included adding the forward pass and the first down marker to college football-both innovations that were designed to open the playing field and reduce player injuries. 34 With the NCAA serving in this limited capacity, collegiate athletics thrived in the first half of the twentieth century. 35 As fan interest skyrocketed, colleges from around the country built large national stadiums to meet the needs of their growing fan base. 36 The popularity of college football grew most rapidly in the Midwest, where the Big Ten colleges emerged as the on-field elite. 37 In 1922, 31 Carter, supra note 24, at 220, 227; see also Kevin Sherrington, Rising Up Against the 'Sanity Code,' DALL. MORNING NEWS, Aug. 18, 2013, 2013 WLNR 26652352 (noting that until 1948, "[t]he NCAA had no enforcement powers"); Parasuraman, supra note 7, at 731 (explaining that even after the creation of the NCAA, college sports maintained its system of "home rule" where individual colleges determined player eligibility for given contests). 32 Smith, supra note 15, at 991. 33 See id.; see also Edelman, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards, supra note 30, at 866 (explaining that "through the 1920s collegiate sports regulation remained primarily a function of student-athletes and faculty, with the NCAA playing a minor role in developing on-the-field rules and organizing championship events"). 34 See WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 101-02. 35 See, e.g., RAYMOND SCHMIDT, SHAPING COLLEGE FOOTBALL: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AN AMERICAN SPORT 1919-1930, at 1, 4, 7 (2007) (describing the 1920s as the "glory era" of college football). 36 See Gary Andrew Poole, Classic Stadiums, Classic Memories, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2005, at F1 (noting that "[w]ith professional football just a bunch of ragtag companysponsored teams in the 1920's, the university squads could barely keep up with their growing fan base," and that "[t]o satisfy the demand, colleges scrambled to erect stadiums that could hold tens of thousands of people, especially in the Midwest"). 37 See id. (discussing how the growth of college football and erecting of large football stadiums occurred most rapidly in the Midwest); see also College Football National Championships in NCAA Division I FBS, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki /College_football_national_championships_in_NCAA_Division_I_FBS (last visited Feb. 22, 2014) (showing that between 1918 and 1933, a Big Ten Conference football team was selected as the national champion on thirteen occasions by one or more of the college football selection committees).
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The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win 1027 for the Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to the Demise of College Sports the Big Ten's Ohio State University opened a 66,210-seat stadium in the heart of its Columbus campus-a stadium that was more than quadruple the size of its old home field. 38 Although Ohio State initially struggled to fill this stadium, it ultimately sold out all 66,210 seats for a late 1922 game against the University of Michigan, and it thereafter began to sell out games with regularity. 39 In fact, Ohio Stadium became so popular among Big Ten football fans that just five years later the University of Michigan decided to build an even bigger stadium that held 72,000 fans, which Michigan fans thereafter nicknamed the "Big House." 40 As college sports enjoyed a growing national audience, studentathletes began to gain celebrity status. 41 In football, University of Illinois running back Red Grange emerged in the late 1920s as the most famous of all college athletes after he scored six touchdowns in a single game against the University of Michigan. 42 Galloping Ghost," Grange enjoyed as much fame as any U.S. celebrity of his time, other than perhaps Charles Lindbergh or Babe Ruth. 43 By his final year in college, Grange had hired an agent to help him negotiate career opportunities in business and in Hollywood. 44 Ultimately, Grange accepted a job with the National Football League's Chicago Bears, a decision that helped to popularize professional football throughout the United States. 45 
E. Transformation of the NCAA
Yet, despite the overwhelming popularity of college sports from 1905 through the 1930s, members of the Big Ten Conference were ready to tear everything apart. 46 By the end of World War II, members of this powerful athletic conference had come to believe that there was a second crisis emerging in college sports: one that involved southern colleges paying "scholarships" to their studentathletes as a way to recruit premier talent. 47 Members of the Big Ten Conference argued for the need to impose strict national rules to prevent southern colleges from continuing to pay their athletes. 48 In truth, the Big Ten's allegations of a national crisis were likely overstated; the only clear effect of colleges paying "scholarships" was he broke through for a 67-yard touchdown. He followed that with touchdown runs of 54 yards and then 44 yards. He astounded everyone present, as well as the larger football world, by rushing for 265 yards and 4 touchdowns in the first 12 minutes of the game. . . . Soon after, he returned and scored his fifth touchdown of the day, on a 13-yard run. For good measure, he tossed a 20-yard scoring pass in the fourth quarter as Illinois won, 39-14. In 41 minutes of play, he was responsible for 402 yards of offense, including 64 yards as a passer."). 43 See Eskenazi, supra note 42 (mentioning Grange's nickname of "Galloping Ghost" and recounting a story of Babe Ruth inviting himself to Grange's hotel room to give him two items of advice about fame: "don't believe anything they write about you, and don't pick up too many dinner checks"). 44 WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 153 (explaining that Grange was "the first big-time celebrity [college] football player"); Marc Edelman, Disarming the Trojan Horse of the UAAA and SPARTA: How America Should Reform its Sports Agent Laws to Conform with True Agency Principles, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 149-50 (2013) (explaining that Red Grange's fame as a college running back was so great that he became among the first athletes to hire a player agent to represent his interests). 45 See Eskenazi, supra note 42 (mentioning Grange's later induction into the Professional Football Hall of Fame in 1963). 46 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing overwhelming popularity of college football from 1905 through the 1930s); see infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing Big Ten Conference's efforts to change the status quo by implementing strong, centralized control of college football via the NCAA). 47 WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 183. 48 See id. at 183-98.
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The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win 1029 for the Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to the Demise of College Sports that it shifted on-field dominance in college football away from the Big Ten and toward the Southeastern Conference. 49 Nevertheless, Big Ten members sought the support of other traditionally strong football schools to prevent the power dynamic from shifting. 50 Thus, the Big Ten Conference worked to transform the NCAA from a "declarant of ideals" into an association with direct authority to punish colleges that did not adhere to its vision of "amateurism." 51 Based on the Big Ten Conference's lobbying efforts, the NCAA in 1948 adopted a "Sanity Code" that empowered the association to ban any member school that compensated a student-athlete with more than just the cost of tuition. 52 The Sanity Code "stipulated that institutions could provide tuition and fees for student athletes but nothing more." 53 Thus, "
[i]f athletes wanted something to eat or a place to sleep, they had to pay for it themselves or work for it." 54 After some southern colleges threatened to leave the NCAA in objection to the Sanity Code, the Big Ten Conference members developed an alternative scheme that replaced the Sanity Code with a complex national regulatory structure for college sports. 55 The Big Ten Conference leaders then successfully nominated one of their own assistants, Walter Byers, to assume the new role as NCAA Executive Director and implement this structure. 56 49 See generally College Football National Championships in NCAA Division I FBS, supra note 37 (noting that between 1940 and 1953, the University of Tennessee was selected as national champion by at least one selection committee on three occasions, and the University of Alabama, University of Georgia, and Georgia Tech University were each selected as national champion by at least one selection committee on two occasions). 50 See WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 184 (discussing a letter written by Big Ten Conference commissioner John Griffiths to Amos Alonzo Stagg of California, requesting his support in a national effort to take steps to prevent Southeastern Conference colleges from providing financial benefits to student-athletes). 51 Carter, supra note 24, at 220, 227. 52 See Sherrington, supra note 31; see also Parasuraman, supra note 7, at 731 (explaining further that the "Sanity Code" consisted of five principles, ranging from financial aid, recruitment, athletic standards for athletes, institutional control, and the principle of amateurism itself). 53 Sherrington, supra note 31. 54 Id. 55 See WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 236 (discussing the creation of the modern NCAA). 56 Byers turned to the sale of television broadcast rights for NCAA sporting events as a way to increase revenues to implement the complex regulatory structure. 57 By selling national television rights to a college football game of the week, Byers generated more than $1 million in revenue during the first year alone. 58 This revenue provided the NCAA with the funds it needed to launch a new investigative arm. 59 But the selling of television rights also opened up a Pandora's Box. 60 Before long, the NCAA was commercializing most aspects of college sports, including the sale of rights to use student-athletes' names and likenesses. 61 
F. College Athletics Under the Modern, Commercial NCAA
The NCAA's paradoxical goal of maximizing revenues in college sports while at the same time preventing student-athletes from participating in commercial ventures has served as a core part of its mission for at least the past half century. 62 Although the NCAA has insisted that it is a nonprofit association that cares deeply about curbing commercialism, the NCAA admitted to Congress in 2006 that its operating revenues for all divisions of college sports totaled approximately $7.8 billion. 63 Since then, the NCAA's aggregate over an NCAA that was "toothless and penniless" and was asked initially to operate the NCAA out of the back of the Big Ten Conference offices). 57 See generally WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 249 (noting that "the NCAA decided to adopt a [televised] game-of-the-week policy" in 1951). 58 See WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 79 (1995) (explaining that in 1952 the NCAA sold NBC rights to a dozen "Game of the Week" shows for a total rights fee of $1,144,000); see also Edelman & Rosenthal, supra note 23, at 1401 (noting that Walter Byers signed this television contract "[w]ithin months of his initial appointment"). 59 Cf. BYERS, supra note 58, at 90 (explaining that among the NCAA's expenditures that followed the signing of its first television contract was the 1952 establishment of a 26,900 square-foot NCAA headquarters office in Kansas City, Missouri, at a cost of $1.5 million). 60 See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text (discussing many of the subsequent ways that the NCAA and its members thereafter commercialized college sports). 61 See, e.g., Peach, supra note 14, at 14 (describing as "controversial" the NCAA's more recent attempts to ensure that none of the revenue from college athletics flows to the student-athletes). 62 See generally infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text. 63 Letter from Myles Brand, President, NCAA, to Hon. William Thomas, Chairman, House Comm. on Ways and Means (Nov. 13, 2006) , at 16, available at http://www.nacua .org/documents/NCAALetter_TaxExempt_ResponsetoHouseWaysMeansCmte.pdf.
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The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win 1031 for the Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to the Demise of College Sports revenues have only continued to increase. 64 Today, the total value of the college sports enterprise is estimated at more than $11 billion. 65 In recent years, the broadcasting and licensing arms of college sports have grown most rapidly, transforming Division I college athletics into something akin to a professional sports league. 66 There are now at least fifty NCAA Division I colleges that produce annual revenues in excess of $50 million, and at least five NCAA Division I colleges that produce annual revenues that exceed $100 million. 67 Among these high revenue-producing schools, the University of Alabama reported revenues of $143.4 million for the 2012-13 academic year-an amount greater than the annual revenues of 25 NBA teams and all 30 NHL teams. 68 These revenues, in turn, are passed along in the form of higher salaries and other fringe benefits for NCAA officers, college presidents, athletic directors, and coaches. 69 During the 2011 calendar year, NCAA Commissioner Mark Emmert received $1.7 million in salary for his role in overseeing the NCAA, and NCAA Chief Operating Officer Jim Isch received $977,531. 70 Meanwhile, salaries of the forty-four head football coaches at NCAA Bowl Championship Series colleges have skyrocketed from $273,300 in 1986 to $2,054,700 today. 71 In forty of the fifty U.S. states, the highest paid public official is currently the head coach of a state university's football or men's basketball team. 72 Nevertheless, current NCAA rules continue to require member colleges to control the commercial rights to student-athlete identities, as well as to prevent member colleges from sharing licensing revenues with their student-athletes. 73 Thus, at a time when the NCAA executives, college presidents, athletic directors, and coaches have all become exceedingly wealthy, many student-athletes remain poor. 74 A 2011 report entitled The Price of Poverty in Big Time College Sports notes that more than eighty-five percent of college athletes on scholarships continue to live below the poverty line. 75 
II THE NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETE NAME & LIKENESS LICENSING LITIGATION A. Prologue
As differences in the standard of living between NCAA Division I employees and their student-athletes have increased, so too has the legal friction between the two groups. 76 Although traditional deterrents to student-athletes suing the NCAA have included the fear of negative backlash from their coaches and the media, this fear has 71 Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment for Antitrust Plaintiffs, supra note 21, at 14 (citing to the case's record at 108-09). 72 (noting the growing "backlash" among student-athletes toward their coaches and others in the college sports system that are making millions of dollars but ignoring the economic realities faced by student-athletes).
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The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win 1033 for the Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to the Demise of College Sports vanquished with greater public understanding about the inequity in college sports. 77 By the early 2000s, it seemed inevitable that a student-athlete would seek redress from the courts if the NCAA did not reform its own policies. 78 Yet the NCAA stubbornly maintained its status quo. Thus, a legal battle ensued. 79 
B. Procedural History
On June 21, 2009, twelve former NCAA football and men's basketball players, led by former UCLA basketball standout Ed O'Bannon, filed an antitrust complaint against the NCAA in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. 80 The complaint alleged, in pertinent part, that NCAA members violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by "conspir[ing] to fix the prices they received for the 'use and sale of [former student athletes'] images, likenesses and/or names at zero dollars'" and by "engag[ing] in a group boycott / refusal to deal conspiracy." 81 The complaint further alleged that these restraints occurred within a product market for live broadcasts, various kinds of non-live game video footage, and college sports videogames. 82 77 Cf. Andy Staples, Current College Athletes Added to O'Bannon Suit Against NCAA, SI.COM (July 18, 2013, 9:52 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/college-football/news /20130718/obannon-lawsuit-college-players-ncaa (explaining that plaintiffs' lawyers were concerned about their ability to find a current Division I college athlete based on the fear of backlash; however, that proved not to be a problem). 78 See NAT'L COLLEGE PLAYERS ASS'N, http://www.ncpanow.org/about (last visited Feb. 22, 2014) (stating that the National College Players Association has sought various means to change the status quo in college sports since holding its first press conference in January 2011). 79 See infra notes 80-95 and accompanying text. 80 See O'Bannon Complaint, supra note 1; see also Order Granting EA's Motion to Dismiss and Denying CLC's and NCAA's Motions to Dismiss, supra note 10, at *1 (stating that the plaintiffs included "eight former college basketball players and four former college football players"); Order Denying Motions to Dismiss at *1, In re Student-Athlete Name & Likenesses Licensing Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) (explaining that all the plaintiffs in the case played their sport "between 1953 and the present"). 81 Order Granting EA's Motion to Dismiss and Denying CLC's and NCAA's Motions to Dismiss, supra note 10, at *2; see also NCAA's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 1, at *3 (discussing the three types of uses of former college athlete likenesses under challenge). 82 Since filing their antitrust complaint, the plaintiffs' case has morphed "like Heraclitus's river: always changing, yet always the same." 83 On January 15, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California consolidated the O'Bannon litigation with a similar case before that same court, Keller v. Electronic Arts. 84 The Keller litigation had asserted claims against the NCAA, the College Licensing Company (the NCAA's independent licensing arm), and the videogame developer Electronic Arts, all related to an alleged conspiracy to violate student-athletes' publicity rights in college sports videogames. 85 The central link between the two cases was one of Electronic Arts's affirmative defenses in Keller: that the NCAA granted it the rights to use student-athlete likenesses. 86 Meanwhile, in the early stages of O'Bannon, the NCAA denied having granted any such rights to third parties. 87 After the court consolidated O'Bannon and Keller into a single litigation (i.e., NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation), the plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint and moved for class certification-a motion that the NCAA vehemently 83 85 See id. For a further discussion of student-athletes' publicity rights and their potential violation by Electronic Arts videogames, see, e.g., Edelman, Closing the "Free Speech" Loophole, supra note 11, at 559 (providing a comprehensive analysis on this topic). 86 See Electronic Arts Inc.'s Answer to Antitrust Allegations in Second Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at *63, In re Student-Athlete Names & Likeness Litig., No. C 09-01967 CW, 2011 WL 3565064 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2011) (noting as Electronic Arts's fourteenth affirmative defense that "[p]laintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of license, because some Antitrust Plaintiffs and putative class members have licensed the right to use their Names, Images, and/or Likenesses"). 87 opposed. 88 Thereafter, the court notified the plaintiffs that they would need to add at least one current student-athlete to their complaint, which led the plaintiffs to file a third amended complaint adding six current student-athletes as named plaintiffs. 89 Nevertheless, before the court could review this third amended complaint, the plaintiffs entered into settlement negotiations with both Electronic Arts and the College Licensing Company, which led to the filing of a stipulation of settlement. 90 This left the court to review the merits of the plaintiffs' antitrust claims only vis-à-vis the NCAA. 91 Once again, the plaintiffs' claims survived a motion to dismiss. . . and to add a new named plaintiff who is a current college athlete"); Fornelli, supra note 88. 90 See Order Denying Motions to Dismiss, supra note 80, at *1, *7; see also Nicole Auerbach, NCAA's Emmert Not Talking Settlement in O'Bannon Lawsuit, USA TODAY, Dec. 11, 2013 (noting that final settlement is still pending before the courts); cf. Potuto et al., supra note 72, at 911 (explaining that "[t]he settlement was no surprise, given that EA Sports' claim that its videogames were entitled to First Amendment protection was rejected by two federal circuit courts"). 91 injunctive relief against the NCAA. 93 The certified class includes the following:
All current and former student-athletes residing in the United States who compete on, or competed on, an NCAA Division I . . . college or university men's basketball team or on an NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision . . . men's football team and whose images, likenesses, and/or names may be, or have been, included in game footage or videogames licensed or sold by [the NCAA], their co-conspirators, or their licensees after the conclusion of the athlete's participation in intercollegiate athletics. 94 The court did not certify a damages subclass. 95 However, former student-athletes who seek to recover money from the NCAA may still attempt to do so through separate litigation.
C. Perfunctory Analysis of the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation
While it is too soon to predict the outcome of the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, the plaintiffs' antitrust arguments enjoy strong legal and factual support. 96 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in pertinent part, states that "[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal." 97 This Act "reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services." 98 Traditionally, courts have interpreted Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in conjunction with preexisting common law, to prohibit any 93 See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Class Certification at *3-7, C 09-1967 CW, 2013 WL 5979327 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013). 94 Id. at *5. 95 Id. at *6, *17 (explaining that the certification of a damages subclass failed under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as the plaintiffs "failed to satisfy the manageability requirement because they have not identified a feasible way to determine which members of the Damages Subclass were actually harmed by the NCAA's allegedly anticompetitive conduct"). 96 See generally NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984) ("By participating in an association which prevents member institutions from competing against each other . . . the NCAA member institutions have created a horizontal restraint-an agreement among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another. A restraint of this type has often been held to be unreasonable as a matter of law."). 97 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 1-7 (2012); see generally Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 70 (explaining that the NCAA's bar on compensation of student-athletes "can reasonably be interpreted as the very antithesis to the type of competitive markets envisioned by drafters of the Sherman Act"). 98 Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) .
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The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win 1037 for the Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to the Demise of College Sports restraints deemed to be "unreasonable." 99 To ascertain whether a restraint is unreasonable, courts apply a three-part test. 100 First, courts will assess whether the restraint involves concerted action between two legally distinct entities that affects trade or commerce among several states ("Threshold Requirements"). 101 Then, courts must determine whether the alleged restraint impermissibly suppresses competition within any relevant market ("Competitive Effects Test"). 102 Finally, courts must decide whether "any antitrust exemption or affirmative defense[] negate[s] the finding of [antitrust] liability." 103 When applying this three-part test based on publicly available information, it seems feasible that the NCAA's restraints against student-athletes' commercial control of their identities violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 104 First, in terms of the Threshold Requirements, it has been widely held that rules implemented by the NCAA represent concerted activity because the NCAA is a bottom-up trade association with its rulemaking powers delegated to its membership. 105 Similarly, most courts have held that NCAA rules affect interstate commerce based on their impact on the nationwide broadcasting and licensing markets. 106 Second, with respect to the Competitive Effects Test, the legal issues are even more fact intensive. 107 A plaintiff challenging the NCAA's control over student-athletes' names and likenesses would need to show that the NCAA exercises market power in some relevant market involving student-athlete names and likenesses and that the anti-competitive effects in this market outweigh any pro-competitive benefits in the same market. 108 With respect to the market power aspect of the Competitive Effects Test, there are subtle differences among the circuits in defining the relevant market. 109 However, most courts have long accepted that "[a] relevant market 'encompasses notions of geography as well as product use, quality, and description.'" 110 Applying this view, "[t]he geographic market [definition] extends to the area of effective competition . . . where buyers can turn for alternative sources of supply" and "[t]he product market [definition] includes the pool of goods or services that enjoy reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand." 111 In the context of collegiate sports, 106 See, e.g., Order on NCAA's and CLC's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at *5 (noting that the District Court for the Northern District of California found that the plaintiffs in O'Bannon had met their requirement with respect to pleading an impact on interstate commerce by alleging that "the anti-competitive effects of which he complains occur in the nation-wide collegiate licensing market"). But see Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 83 ("[E]ight lower courts within the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits have contrarily held that the NCAA's 'eligibility' rules are exempt from antitrust scrutiny because these rules do not affect 'trade or commerce' and thus fail to meet one of the threshold requirements for antitrust scrutiny. These decisions, however, rely on inaccurate factual presumptions about the NCAA and outdated interpretations of antitrust law that have since been rejected by the Supreme Court. Thus, although these decisions survive as a deviant strain of precedent within three federal circuits, they cannot survive the Supreme Court's current antitrust jurisprudence."). 107 there are thus several plausible antitrust markets in which the NCAA at least arguably exercises market power. 112 Among them, the NCAA at least arguably exercises market power within a national market for the "rights to use the images of athletes connected with collegiate sports." 113 Finally, the third step of the analysis-that of determining whether any antitrust exemption or affirmative defense negates the finding of antitrust liability-requires a balancing of the economic effects within such market. The academic literature on this issue widely recognizes that the NCAA's practices yield at least some bona fide anticompetitive effect. 114 As University of Indiana Sports Law professor Gary Roberts astutely pointed out in his 1996 Tulane Law Review article, "rules restricting the compensation student-athletes can be given by their universities for athletic services [are generally seen as] a blatant price (wage) fix." 115 Thus, unless the NCAA can prove an economically recognizable pro-competitive benefit of its restraints on student-athlete compensation, it "has no reasonable defense for its otherwise collusive wage fixing." 116 The NCAA's pleadings in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation nevertheless indicate that the NCAA believes there are at least two broad categories of affirmative defenses that support its restraints on student-athletes' commercial rights to their own likenesses. 117 First, the NCAA believes that its rules precluding student-athletes from controlling the commercial rights to their likenesses are pro-competitive because they preserve 112 See generally Order on NCAA's and CLC's Motions to Dismiss, supra note 7, at *4 (quoting Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solutions, 513 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2008), for the proposition that "the validity of the 'relevant market' is typically a factual element rather than a legal element"). 113 Id. at *5; see generally Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 52 (explaining that "[t]he relevant geographic market [in antitrust lawsuits against the NCAA] is generally accepted to be the United States"). Without conducting a full factual discovery on this matter, plaintiffs theoretically might be able to support the finding of such a market based on the Collegiate Licensing Company's statement that it manages "more than 75%" of this purported market. Order on NCAA's and CLC's Motions to Dismiss, supra note 7, at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 114 competitive balance in college sports competitions. 118 In addition, the NCAA alleges that, even absent competitive balance concerns, controlling the commercial rights to student-athletes' names and likenesses is necessary to maintain the financial viability of college sports. 119 These arguments are explored further in the next two sections of this article.
III AN ANALYSIS OF NCAA COMMERCIAL RESTRAINTS AND COMPETITIVE BALANCE
A. The NCAA's Argument that Revenue Sharing Would Destroy Competitive Balance
The NCAA has long argued that "amateurism is a sine qua non of college sports" and its rules that forbid members from sharing revenues with student-athletes are both pro-competitive and necessary for the maintenance of college athletics because they "preserve amateurism and thereby maintain competitive balance." 120 Without these rules, the NCAA argues, prospective student-athletes would flock to high-revenue producing schools, and competitive balance in college sports would be destroyed. 121 Courts are currently in flux as to whether competitive balance even constitutes a legally cognizable affirmative defense under antitrust law. 122 On the one hand, past decisions such as Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. and Mackey v. NFL have held that closer game scores alone can 118 See Order Denying Motions to Compel Production of Documents by Nonparties at *2, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., Nos. 09-cv-01967-CW (NC), 11-mc-80300 CW (NC), 12-mc-80020 CW (NC), 2012 WL 629225 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (noting that "[i]n support of one of its affirmative defenses, the NCAA's claims that the NCAA rules . . . promote amateurism and competitive balance between and among NCAA member institutions"); Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 51 (discussing the longstanding nature of this argument by the NCAA). As a matter of law, there remains some question as to whether competitive balance is truly a pro-competitive benefit that courts may consider. See Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 96. 119 See Defendant NCAA's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 3, at 2 (purporting that the NCAA rules that preclude student-athlete compensation "allow its survival in the face of commercializing pressures"). 120 Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 51. 121 See NCAA's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 1, at *17 (stating that "it is basic economics that providing substantial and widely varying payments to prospective recruits would create strong incentives for recruits to move to high revenue schools"). 122 Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 96.
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The Future of Amateurism After Nevertheless, it is unnecessary to delve into a nuanced discussion about when, if at all, competitive balance legitimizes a sports league's labor restraints. 125 Even if one were to presume that competitive balance is always a bona fide defense to labor market restraints in organized sports, the NCAA's competitive balance argument still fails for four separate reasons: (1) the college sports industry already lacks year-to-year competitive balance; (2) the college sports industry also lacks seasonal competitive balance; (3) lack of competitive balance does not translate into poor attendance; and (4) there are less restrictive ways to maintain competitive balance. 126 
B. The College Sports Industry Already Lacks Year-to-Year Competitive Balance
First, the NCAA's competitive balance defense may be called into doubt by strong evidence that there has never been competitive balance in college sports on a year-to-year basis. 127 According to a thorough study performed by New Mexico State University economics professor Jim Peach, the historic distribution of the top eight rankings among Division I college football teams indicates a very high concentration among winners in Division I sports 123 Id.; see also Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. 593 F.2d 1173, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding the NFL draft's alleged pro-competitive effect based on increased on-field competitive balance to be "nil"); Mackey v. NFL, 542 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding that the possibility of a decline in quality of play based on alleged loss of competitive balance does not justify the NFL's current restraints on the free market for NFL player labor). 124 Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 96; see also American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010) (noting that "the interest in maintaining competitive balance among athletic teams is legitimate and important" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 833 (3rd Cir. 2010) (analyzing competitive balance concerns in the context of an antitrust analysis involving competitive tennis contest). 125 contests. 128 For example, between 1950 and 2005, just five college football teams have accounted for a quarter of all top eight finishers, and just twenty-two teams have accounted for three-quarters of all top eight finishers. 129 The University of Oklahoma has finished in the top eight on twenty-nine separate occasions. 130 Meanwhile, numerous Division I college football teams have not even finished in the top eight once. 131 The same general findings about lack of competitive balance also extend to men's college basketball. 132 Between 1950 and 2005, just four men's Division I college basketball teams represented nearly a quarter of all Final Four appearances, and thirteen colleges represented half of all appearances. 133 Both the University of North Carolina and the University of California-Los Angeles have made the Final Four on fifteen occasions. 134 Duke University has made it fourteen times. 135 Meanwhile, many other NCAA Division I colleges have not appeared in even a single Final Four.
There has also been a lack of competitive balance over time in both low-revenue producing sports and in women's sports. 136 Since the NCAA first began to sponsor men's volleyball championships in 1970, just two schools-UCLA and Pepperdine-have been to the championship game thirty-four times, and just six schools combine to account for more than eighty percent of all possible championship appearances. 137 Similarly, in women's college basketball, just two schools-the University of Tennessee and Louisiana Tech University-account for twenty-seven percent of all Final Four appearances, and just six schools account for more than half of all Final Four appearances. 138 The University of Tennessee women's basketball team has appeared in the Final Four on sixteen of twentyfour occasions; meanwhile, many Division I women's college basketball teams have not appeared in a single Final Four.
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C. The College Sports Industry Also Already Lacks Seasonal Competitive Balance
The NCAA's competitive balance defense also must fail because there is little competitive balance within many individual college games. 140 For example, during college football's 2013 season, there were sixteen different games in which a Top Twenty-Five ranked team defeated its scheduled opponent by forty-five or more points. 141 Those blowouts included three games played on September 21, 2013, with the following scores: Ohio State University 76, Florida A&M 0; Louisville University 72, Florida International University 0; and the University of Miami 77, Savannah State College 7. 142 NCAA Division I men's basketball likewise has featured many contests that lack any semblance of competitive balance. 143 In November 2013, there were six NCAA Division I men's basketball games in which a Top Twenty-Five ranked team defeated its opponent by more than forty-five points. 144 145 Even in the annual NCAA men's basketball tournament, which has become one of the most popular college sporting events of the year, there are regularly first-round games between No. 1 and No. 16 seeded teams with final scores separated by more than thirty points. 146 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 1019
D. Lack of Competitive Balance Does Not Translate into Poor Attendance
The third reason why the NCAA's competitive balance defense must fail is because those games most lacking in competitive balance have not harmed college sports' revenue stream. 147 To the contrary, many of the more attended college football games during the 2013 season were games in which fans should have reasonably expected one team to defeat the other by a large point margin. 148 150 While the strong fan turnout at both of these games cannot preclude the possibility that competitive balance is one factor in determining fan attendance, it fully rebuts the argument that competitive balance is the determinant factor.
Equally as revealing, a few of the top-ranked college football teams in 2013 actually had better home attendance for blowout wins against unranked opponents than for close wins against highly-ranked opponents. 151 For example, the University of Oklahoma football team had 84,776 home fans in attendance for its 48-10 blowout win over Iowa State University, but just 84,734 fans in attendance for its narrow 38-30 home win over comparably ranked Texas Tech University. 152 Similarly, the UCLA football team had higher home attendance for its 37-10 home victory against the unranked University of California-Berkeley than for its 38-33 loss to a comparably ranked differential in NCAA men's basketball games between No. 1 and No. 16 seeds was 26.4 points). 147 153 Although idiosyncrasies in ticket resale markets could have played some role in fan preferences, these findings on their face seem to indicate that fans of both the University of Oklahoma and the University of California-Los Angeles might actually prefer games with less competitive balance, and thus the higher likelihood of a home team victory.
E. There Are Less Restrictive Ways of Maintaining Competitive Balance
Finally, the NCAA's competitive balance defense must fail because even if it were true that college sports currently maintain some competitive balance (which is doubtful for the reasons discussed above) and that the loss of competitive balance would lead to a loss of revenues (again, doubtful for the reasons discussed above), the NCAA still could implement competitive balance in numerous other ways that would be less restrictive on the financial rights of student-athletes. 154 One alternative would be to allow student-athletes to form a national association to collectively bargain against the NCAA in a manner similar to how professional athletes currently bargain with their sports leagues. 155 Collective bargaining might lead to an arrangement under which competitive balance is maintained through negotiated compensation floors and caps, as well as some revenue sharing among college athletic departments. 156 If OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 1019 organized properly, this alternative would be entirely exempt from antitrust scrutiny based on antitrust law's non-statutory labor exemption. 157 Another alternative would be "to devolve power from the NCAA to the various collegiate conferences." 158 As economists Daniel A. Rascher and Andrew D. Schwarz explained in a 2000 article published by Antitrust Magazine, this result would allow each conference to "choose a common wage regime, and within [each] conference, the necessary balance for the creation of a team sport would be maintained, without the need for an overarching supercartel [sic] to control the entire market for college-age athletes." 159 Imposing these restraints on the conference level, rather than the national level, makes economic sense for two reasons: (1) no single individual athletic conference is likely to exercise market power, 160 and (2) many athletic conferences already have a program for revenue sharing among members. 161 Furthermore, because most college various revenue sharing arrangements to smooth differences in revenues between the independent professional sports teams). 157 (explaining that a majority of the circuits have found the non-statutory labor exemption to insulate from antitrust liability any restraint that involves mandatory subjects of bargaining, which primarily affects the parties involved, and that is reached through bona fide, arm's-length bargaining; other circuits, such as the Second, apply this exemption even more broadly). 158 See Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 54; see also Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 96 (suggesting that "colleges could just as easily implement salary caps at the conference level rather than at the league level"). 159 See Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 54. 160 See Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 97 (explaining that unlike the NCAA, which is a national trade association, individual member conferences are not likely to be large enough to exercise power over student-athlete labor within any relevant market); see generally Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding the market for college athletes' labor to be "national in scope"); cf. Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the enforcement of a rule created at the conference level that prevents colleges from paying their athletes was permissible under the rule of reason). 161 In addition to the NCAA's competitive balance defense of its commercial restraints on student-athletes, the NCAA further argues that the financial viability of college sports overall would be destroyed if it were not able to control the commercial rights to student-athlete names and likenesses. 163 This argument arises from a number of different NCAA theories of financial ruin. 164 Among those theories, the NCAA's most common argument is that its restraints on student-athletes' identities are needed to make "NCAA sports more popular, increasing output, consumer demand and consumer value." 165 The NCAA supports this claim through a self-commissioned survey that purports fans would be less likely "to watch, listen to, or attend games" if football or men's basketball players were paid. 166 It also relies upon the declarations of University of Michigan President Mary Sue Coleman and University of Wisconsin-Madison Chancellor Rebecca Blank, who claim that proceeds equally. The conference and its members continue to utilize a revenue-sharing model, dividing media rights, bowl payouts and other profits among all conference institutions."). 162 Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 96-97 (discussing this same argument in the broader context on salary/wage restraints). 163 See infra notes 165-71 and accompanying text. 164 See id. 165 NCAA's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 1, at *12. 166 Id. at *12-13 (citing the "Dennis survey" commissioned by an NCAA purported expert, which alleges that 68.9% of respondents were opposed to revenue sharing with student-athletes, and that a minority of respondents would be "less likely to watch, listen to, or attend games if football or men's basketball players were paid").
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B. College Sports Fans Do Not Truly Care if the Athletes Are Unpaid
Nevertheless, none of the NCAA's arguments of financial doom can be supported by any meaningful facts. 172 The NCAA's argument that consumers are only interested in college sports because studentathletes are unpaid is dubious. 173 Other than the NCAA's recent selfserving study, there has never been any empirical evidence that indicates fan devotion to college sports emerges from the NCAA's 100:0 revenue split with its student-athletes. 174 To the contrary, even at times when it has been widely reported that student-athletes have received some pay, fan attendance at college sporting events featuring these athletes has remained strong. 175 For example, the average attendance at Southern Methodist University college football games rose between 1985 and 1986, even as the NCAA was publicly investigating the college for allowing impermissible stipends to student-athletes. 176 Additionally, the recent testimony by University of Michigan President Mary Sue Coleman and University of Wisconsin-Madison Chancellor Rebecca Blank in favor of preventing revenue sharing with student-athletes is fraught with self-interest. Both Coleman and Blank are employees of Big Ten Conference colleges-the very same colleges that sought to impose the NCAA's current restraints on student-athletes beginning with their lobbying on behalf of the Sanity Code in the late 1940s. In addition, if a share of the University of Michigan and University of Wisconsin-Madison athletic revenues were reallocated to student-athletes, there would be a smaller fund of money to compensate either Coleman or Blank, thus providing a direct financial incentive for each to oppose granting NCAA members the option of sharing revenues with student-athletes.
Furthermore, to the contrary of the NCAA's purported evidence of fan demand for college sports featuring only unpaid athletes, actual past behaviors of college sports fans indicate that many fans might actually prefer college sports if the athletes were paid. 177 For example, the college booster clubs are some of "the biggest supporters of college sports," and yet they "are also the ones who are often caught professionalizing the sport by paying their alma mater's athletes under the table." 178 In addition, the NCAA has not hesitated to give fans the impression that student-athletes are professionals by scheduling important games during class days and displaying their images throughout campuses and the Internet as part of their own marketing efforts. 01/magazine /lets-start-paying-college-athletes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (explaining that college athletes "look around and see jerseys with their names on them being sold in the bookstores" and due to the time commitment involved in playing their sport "learn early on not to take any course that might require real effort or interfere with the primary reason they are on campus"); Sean Gregory, It's Time to Pay College Athletes, TIME MAG. (Sept. 16, 2013), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2151167,00.html (noting that "[t]he athlete is the most available publicity material [a] college has" and that "[a] great scientific discovery will make good press material for a few days, but nothing to compare to that of the performance of a first-class athlete"); cf. Finally, if it were true that fan interest in college athletics would decline if student-athletes were compensated, there would be no need for the NCAA to impose an association-wide rule to prevent member colleges from reaching other arrangements with their student-athletes. Indeed, if college athletics truly would be more popular if no studentathletes received compensation, no NCAA member college would ever make the decision to compensate student-athletes even if the NCAA allowed it.
C. Sharing Revenues with Student-Athletes Will Not Place NCAA Members at High Risk of Title IX Lawsuits, Nor Does the NCAA Truly Even Care Much About Gender Pay Equality
It is similarly doubtful that either the NCAA or its member colleges would face liability under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 for sharing licensing revenues for the use of student-athletes' names and likenesses, even if a greater aggregate amount in revenues are shared with male student-athletes. 180 Although this would be a legal issue of first impression, Title IX's requirements prohibiting gender-based pay discrimination are generally interpreted as coextensive with the antidiscrimination provisions that appear in the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 181 Thus, disparate compensation of male and female student-athletes would be permissible under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 as long as the male student-athletes' job descriptions involved greater skill, effort, and responsibility than the female student-athletes' job descriptions. 182 792 (2010) (detailing at length how "academic leaders increasingly use intercollegiate sports as a catalyst and means" to achieve various economic goals). 180 See infra notes 181-88 and accompanying text. 181 See John Gaal et al., Gender-Based Pay Disparities in Intercollegiate Coaching: The Legal Issues, 28 J.C. & U.L. 519, 545-46 (2002) (explaining that "the few courts that have addressed Title IX as an independent employment discrimination statute in the context of coaches' compensation have not viewed it as any broader than the EPA or Title VII"); see also Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the plaintiff's Title IX claim fails for the same reasons her Equal Pay Act claim fails). 182 See Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1074 ("To make out a prima facie case [under the Equal Pay Act,] the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the jobs being compared are 'substantially equal.'"); see also Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012) ("No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the rate 1052 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 1019 There is a strong argument that male student-athletes' jobs indeed involve greater skill, effort, and responsibility for purposes of pay discrimination laws because male student-athletes in football and men's basketball typically generate substantially higher revenues for their colleges from the use of their names and likenesses than do female student-athletes. 183 The case that seems to best support such a view is Stanley v. University of Southern California. 184 There, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a motion to enjoin the University of Southern California from paying more to its men's basketball coach than to its women's basketball coach, citing that the revenue generated by the men's coach is "90 times greater than the revenue generated by the women's basketball team." 185 Furthermore, it is worth noting that the NCAA's alleged concerns about the gender pay gap seem disingenuous in light of various NCAA members' longstanding practice of allowing for a wide pay gap between male and female coaches, even in sports where differences in revenue generation would not justify such a distinction. 186 A 2001 Chronicle of Higher Education survey on the gender pay gap in college sports found that the disparity in pay among college athletic coaches was far greater than the disparity in society at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions . . . ."). 183 See Gaal et al., supra note 181, at 527 ("Courts have recognized that differences in revenue production and media expectations can provide evidence of a difference in responsibilities sufficient to preclude a finding of 'equal work'"); see also Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1322 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The responsibility to produce a large amount of revenue is evidence of a substantial difference in responsibility."); Jacobs v. Coll. of William & Mary, 517 F. Supp. 791, 797 (E.D. Va. 1980), aff'd without opinion, 661 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that the obligation to produce revenue demonstrates that coaching jobs are not substantially equal). 184 13 F.3d 1313. 185 Id. at 1321 (rejecting a request by the former head coach of the University of Southern California women's basketball team for a preliminary injunction enjoining the university from offering a lower wage to its women's basketball coach). Nevertheless, it is important to note that nearly five years later, upon motion for summary judgment, the same court avoided addressing the issue of whether substantial differences in revenue generation necessarily make jobs dissimilar, finding that the University of Southern California had separately proven that the pay differential between its men's and women's coaches was due to bona fide difference in the levels of experience and qualifications between the coaches. See Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1074-75. 186 See Gaal et. al., supra note 181, at 520 (quoting a thirty-two percent disparity in salary levels for softball and baseball coaches, and a fifty-four percent disparity in salary levels for men's and women's ice hockey coaches).
2014]
The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win 1053 for the Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to the Demise of College Sports overall. 187 Meanwhile, statistics accumulated by the Department of Education from 2003 to 2010 show that the average salary for NCAA Division I men's team coaches increased sixty-seven percent, whereas the salary for women's team coaches increased just sixteen percent. 188 In the context of the gender disparity of college coaches' pay, the NCAA has remained largely silent.
D. There Are Enough Revenues to Go Around for College Athletics to
Operate Profitably Even After Sharing Revenues with Student-Athletes Finally, despite the NCAA's assertions to the contrary, it is indeed possible for the NCAA and its member schools to operate at a profit even after compensating student-athletes for the use of their likenesses. 189 What would be required, however, would be for the NCAA to operate as a leaner, more efficient trade organization, and for NCAA member colleges to begin paying their presidents, athletic directors, and coaches at salary rates that are more reflective of the free market. 190 Much like many other monopolist trade associations, the NCAA currently operates inefficiently. 191 Since the early 1950s, the NCAA has maintained a complex operating manual, which today
